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ABSTRACT
It has been argued that the 1761 treaty between the M i'kmaq and British at Governor Belcher's farm proves that their relationship was
a simple one of conqueror and conquered. This paper offers an alternative interpretation of the 1761 treaty. Through the guidance of
stories told by women in my family, the paper argues that historic treaty rights must be understood within the context of relationships
instead of individual or collective rights. It concludes that stories about how we, as M i'kmaq, are to relate to one another is central to
the project of nationhood. 
RÉSUM É
On fait valoir que le traité de 1761 entre les M i'kmaq et les Britanniques à la ferm e du Gouverneur Belcher prouve que leur relation était
une relation simple entre le conquéreur et le conquis. Cet article offre une interprétation alternative du traité de 1761. Grâce à l'aide de
récit d'histoires, par des femmes de ma famille, l'article fait valoir que les droits de traités historiques doivent être compris dans le
contexte de relations au lieu de droits collectifs ou individuels. Il conclut que le récit d'histoires sur la façon dont nous, en tant que
M i'kmaqs, devont nous situer l'un par rapport à l'autre, est central à l'esprit national du projet.
The conversation with Leon, my Aunt's
partner, began in a normal friendly kind of way. We
were discussing my plans for the summer. I had just
come to the reserve the day before and I was
looking for a job. Sitting there in my Aunt's house
and looking around at the pictures of my cousins I
realize now that I was trying to place myself
somewhere. Anyway, I spoke up:
"I'm thinking about volunteering at the
Restorative Justice Initiative: they said they might
hire me too. But I'm hoping that I'll be able to do
research on treaties. I'm going to present my
proposal to the Chief and council on Monday." 
Leon, who is laying on the couch, trying to
pretend that I didn't just interrupt his favorite TV
show, scoffs: "pfhh, they aren't going to want to
hear anything about that." 
While lifting an incredulous eyebrow, I
ask: "Well why not?" 
I say incredulous because I had just
listened to my other uncle complain the previous
day about how the chief and council don't care at all
about treaty rights. And then only a few minutes
later he told me that he isn't concerned with
changing anything, he just wanted to be able to live.
He told me that this is what everyone on the reserve
wants. At the time, we were in the middle of a
discussion/argument and I said that there wasn't
much of a difference between his position and the
position of the band council. He got mad at me and
told me that I needed to be subtler about things.
And I know he's right.
Leon, who had been laying down, sits up:
"They sold us out. While we were working our butts
off in the woods, they signed agreements with the
government. When the RCMP came and told us
this, we told them that this was Crown land and the
band council's jurisdiction ends at the reserve line.
Then we were arrested. Your cousin was involved
in this too. [I knew this already and I heard that his
wife was ripping mad that he got himself arrested].
Now we're going through the courts to show that the
Crown land was always reserved land: reserved for
us. It's our right."  
Getting more excited, he continues: "It's
the same with the fishing rights. They sign off our
rights with agreements and now we can only catch
snow crab for commercial sale." 
I agree with him that all of that is
completely preposterous. "Why would the band
council do that? You guys seem to have the upper
hand when it comes to fishing."
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Looking down and then up again, he
replies: "they flash lots of money in front of their
faces."
I can feel this burning in the pit of my
stomach and it all clouds in my head: "It's
senseless." Then I ask: "But, Leon, why do you
think that you have this right?"
Looking at me like I have two heads, he
answers: "the treaties" 
My uncle Max's warning quickly flashes
through my mind. But I go ahead with a very direct
question: "So the terms in the treaties indicate that
you have these rights?"
Leon answers: "We are a nation. That is
what they indicate." 
"I disagree with you."
Leon's back straightens. I know he is
caught a bit off guard because he thought that we
were in agreement about this. But again, I continue.
"I don't think that our ancestors intended
for the treaties to be about laying out the exact
terms of our co-existence. I mean the treaties are
not about divvying up the land in return for
protection of their interests." I know at this point
that there is a fine line between following those
intentions and espousing some right-wing agenda
about there being no such thing as a special right.
So I feel a bit afraid about this but, at the same time,
I have this feeling of determination because I've
been thinking about this for so long and been unable
to write about it. Anyway, as you can well imagine
I could feel the life in me as well. 
"What do you mean?" he replies. "My
grandfather and his grandfather and your
grandfather too, they all knew that the treaties
entitled us to fish."
"I know. My grandfather went to court
over his treaty right to fish."
"Yeah. He lost that case." Leon continues:
"I remember my grandfather telling me about how
we had a right to fish and so we should fish no
matter what. If they come to us and tell us we can't,
ignore them. If they attempt to rock our boat or take
our nets, push them away. And if they try to stop us
by shooting at us, kill them."
Silence.
"Leon, I'm not trying to say that we don't
have a right to fish. It's just that we have to start
thinking about this in a different way. I think that
treaties are about how we are going to share a
common way of life."  
"That's assimilation, we were always a
Nation. We didn't want a common anything.
According to the Wampum belt, the lines run
parallel. They do not converge." 
At this point, I feel unsure of myself again.
What right do I have to think differently from him
about this? Maybe I just don't understand. But
instead of hiding behind this insecurity, which is
necessarily a part of my relationship with my
family, I falter for a moment, and then my voice
raises a pitch. "I agree," my heart begins to race "we
have our own legal systems, we have our own way
of being." Now, the words flow out of my mouth.
"And if you really think about it, fundamentally,
justice is about the relationship between the
individual and the community. So if we are going to
actually think through what treaties are about we
shouldn't be looking at the terms of it. We should be
looking at the type of relationship that should be
established."       
Leon is sitting up, ready to get into a good
argument over this. I can see us discussing every
part of this, testing each point of our arguments.
Then my aunt walks in. We start discussing her job
and my cousins. 
I could tell Leon wasn't listening. He was
in one of those distracted, "trying to figure things
out in your head" states. While my aunt and I were
discussing what my cousins have been up to, Leon
pops up: "Consistency? W e are lacking
consistency?"
DEFINING TREATIES 
When I first looked at the transcription of
an agreement made at Governor Belcher's farm in
1761 between the Governor and the Mi'kmaq, like
Leon I wanted to see that the Mi'kmaq had stood
firm in their resolve to protect their nationhood. I
thought that they would be clear about their
interests: as a nation they would have the right to
land and all the resources therein and in exchange
for this assurance they would no longer attack the
British. Also, I wanted to find in this agreement a
clue to what they had perceived to be a just
relationship. Knowing that this was ideal, I thought
that at least there would be no mention of
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submission and most definitely no mention of the
Mi'kmaq as conquered. 
Well, as I read what was transcribed by the
British, my heart began to sink. In Governor
Belcher's opening statement, he stated: "I assure
myself that you submit yourselves to his allegiance
with hearts of duty and gratitude as to your merciful
conqueror." And to make matters even worse a
Mi'kmaq chief opening with: "My Lord and Father,"
stated "certain it is that we would have wretchedly
perished unless relieved by your humanity, for we
were reduced to extremities more intolerable than
Death itself. You are Master here: such has been the
will of God, he has given you the Dominion of
those vast countries, always crowning your
Enterprises with success."  So not only did Belcher1
state that the Mi'kmaq were a conquered people, but
the Mi'kmaq also seemed to be affirming this. Of
course, we have to take into account that this was
transcribed by the British and translated via a
French priest. Nonetheless, as an indication of an
oral agreement between the Mi'kmaq and British
there is enough supporting evidence to show that
this was a treaty of surrender by an already
dependant and conquered people. As you can well
imagine, I was forced to re-examine my premises
and assumptions. While asking myself to what
extent I could read this transcription literally, I
figured out that I was on the wrong track. I had
been reading the agreement with conquest or
nationhood as the only possible alternatives. 
The switch from thinking of treaty
interpretation as an either/or problem began with
my cousin sitting me down to tell me a story. He
began by telling me about how his grandmother sat
him down one day, covered all of the crosses in the
living room with sheets and then told him the
creation story. Glooscap was the first Mi'kmaq and
he came from elements of the land. As a cultural
hero with special gifts, Glooscap taught lessons to
the Mi'kmaq through misdeeds and accidents. His
lessons benefited them because they then would
know what could happen and in this way they
learned. At the time, the story sounded strangely
familiar to me. After thinking about it for awhile, I
realized that without actually telling me this story,
my mother had taught me to learn in a similar
fashion. Then finally, as I was trying to write about
treaties, I realized that the significance of the story
did not lie in its authenticity, consistency, or
entirety. The pattern or guidance of the story reveals
that our worldview is constantly fluctuating. It is in
constant motion but a continuity is also evident:
indeed, all of our relations are integral to the
culture. 
UNDERSTANDING THE TREATY
The treaty at Belcher's farm, according to
Stephen Patterson in "Indian-white relations in
Nova Scotia"  supports his thesis that in 1761 the2
Mi'kmaq surrendered to the British on British terms.
Throughout the period leading up to this cession,
the Mi'kmaq were autonomous peoples, "exercising
choices which represented their best efforts to
accommodate the European intruders and adjust to
the challenges and opportunities they posed."  He3
further argues that since cultural values are the
equivalent of political decisions and self-interest is
the equivalent of political conscience, the Mi'kmaq
were not motivated by a collective sense of cultural
identity. Instead, their choices were "driven by
conscious political decisions rooted in people's
often imperfect understanding of their own
self-interest."  Cultural differences therefore, were4
irrelevant to the process.
Following Patterson's argument that the
Mi'kmaq were individually following their own
interests, he suggests that they miscalculated them
when they allied with the French. After the defeat of
the French at Fort Louisbourg in 1758, Quebec in
1759 and Montreal in 1760, Patterson argues that
the Mi'kmaq, who were dependent on French
supplies and ammunition, could no longer
successfully attack the British and were out of
food.  As a result, the Mi'kmaq were forced to5
eventually surrender to the British as indicated by
the 1761 treaty in which a Mi'kmaq chief states that
their intention in negotiating with the British was
both "to yield [themselves] up to [the British]
without requiring any Terms on [their] part"  and6
also to submit themselves to the "laws of [the
British] government, faithful and obedient to the
Crown."7
Patterson's argument obviously supports
Crown sovereignty. But the way he does it is fairly
surprising. Anyone would think that he starts out in
favor of Aboriginal nations when he argues that
they were autonomous peoples who were not
victims of history. But things begin to shift when he
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argues that the implications of this self-sufficiency
is that they made choices without concern to
cultural values or at least that the political decisions
which represent self-interest are the extent to which
cultural values can be taken into consideration.
Patterson believes that as reasonable beings we
make decisions according to local conditions and
circumstances. And according to the tenets of
liberal thought, we must all be reasonable beings in
order to be rights-bearing individuals. If rights then
serve to ensure that all are equal then the rights here
involve ensuring that we all have the equal right to
make decisions.
Carrying this over to treaty interpretation,
Patterson's argument favors looking at treaties as
contractual agreements that set out absolute terms
of the relationship. He finds however, that since the
Mi'kmaq were surrendering, they were not in a good
situation to negotiate favorable terms. As a result,
the treaties merely assured the Mi'kmaq that with
their surrender they would receive, like all other
subjects, the protection of the Crown: they would be
treated equally. The treaties then do not outline any
kind of special rights for the Mi'kmaq.  
Like Patterson, Sakej Henderson argues
that the Mi'kmaq were independent peoples but his
argument differs on the question of conquest.
Henderson argues that the treaties set out terms of
peace and friendship with the British. As a result,
the Mi'kmaq never ceded any land, they only agreed
to shared jurisdiction. The premise of his argument
is that the Mi'kmaq were distinctive peoples with
their own languages, institutions and legal codes.
Upon entering treaties with the British, they did so
on equal terms and as distinctive peoples. By
exploring the treaty order of which the 1761
agreement at Belcher's farm was part, Henderson
challenges Patterson's argument that the Mi'kmaq
ceded their land. He finds that the intent of
prerogative treaties on both sides were to affirm
terms of co-existence.  8
These terms of co-existence, however,
were not set in stone; instead they were formed
through relations between the Mi'kmaq and the
colonists. In order to keep peace in Nova Scotia, the
British made sure that the Mi'kmaq were happy by
making numerous concessions. For example, when
some of the Indians' property was violated by
colonists, it was dealt with in a private way instead
of hazarding "a decision in the courts, where the
Verdicts if found against them for want of sufficient
evidence of otherwise, might have discontented
their Tribes, and have been of disagreeable
consequences in the present situation of affairs."9
These instances demonstrate that the terms of
relations between the Mi'kmaq and British were not
necessarily determined solely by colonial interests.
However, this requires that the Mi'kmaq
had some understanding of the meaning of a treaty.
If I take as a given that the Mi'kmaq were not
exchanging territory for protection, it seems that
they are not addressing the terms laid out in either
Belcher's speech or the written treaty. The Mi'kmaq
chief is vague, referring mostly to the generosity
and good will of the British. And as demonstrated
in this excerpt from the ceremony, the only term
that he actually acknowledges is the one relating to
religion:
There is one thing that binds me more
strongly and firmly to you than I can
possibly express and that is your indulging
me in the free exercise of the religion in
which I have been instructed from my
cradle. You confess and believe as well as
I, in Jesus Christ, the eternal word of
almighty God. I own I long doubted
whether you was of this faith. But at
present I know you much better than I did
formerly. I therefore renounce all the ill
opinions that have been insinuated to me
and my brethren in times past against the
subject of Great Britain.10
Taking this into consideration, there seems to be
two choices in interpreting the Mi'kmaq
understanding of the treaty: they did not understand
it or they were only concerned with securing the
more spiritual aspects of it.   
In meetings that led up to the agreement,
the Mi'kmaq had expressed their interests beyond
religious freedom. These included interest in
property, trade and liberty to fish and hunt. In 1762,
the Indians made "great Complaints that settlements
have been made and possessions taken, of lands, the
Property of which they have by treaties reserved to
themselves." Belcher then lists the areas that are not
to be disturbed which included a fair share of land
in Nova Scotia. The Mi'kmaq also settled terms of
trade with the British which were "so much above
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what private dealers could have afforded."  At a11
meeting between Michel Augustine (an ancestor of
Stephen Augustine and myself), Chief of the
Richibucto, and Paul Laurent, Chief of the Tribe of
LaHave, speaking on behalf of "several tribes of
Mickmacks," they agreed to the terms of a peace
and friendship treaty and that "truckhouses should
be established for supplying [them] with what they
should want."  During these meetings, religion was12
not even mentioned by the chiefs; instead the
truckhouses seemed to be the most urgent piece of
business. In these discussions, Mi'kmaq were
concerned with ensuring a general way of life. 
The meetings that led up to the agreement
at Belcher's farm seem to contradict the chief's
statement in the treaty signing ceremony that
religion was of utmost importance. But what this is
signifying is not that the Mi'kmaq were not at all
concerned with the material aspects of life. Instead,
the chief was indicating that in order to share the
land, they were also going to have to share a
common way of life. They would have to share an
understanding that would let them both be. This
perspective, then, does not at all conflict with the
principles of the wampum belt. Religion, after all,
is extremely important, it is a testament to how we
should relate to one another. And it determines our
conception of a good society. Before the peace
treaty, as indicated in the transcription, the Mi'kmaq
had been falsely led to believe that the British were
not Christians. The French and the Acadians must
have been spreading some nasty rumors about the
British. Nonetheless, this tells us something very
important about the core issue of this treaty. The
Mi'kmaq recognized that to secure peace and
friendship, a relationship that is based on a common
understanding must be established. 
RIGHTS AS RELATIONSHIPS
Rights are generally construed as though
they are limits on the power of the state in order to
protect rights-bearing individuals. This suggests that
rights are "trumps," which, according to Dworkin,
"state a goal for the community as a whole" and
overrule "some background justification for
political decisions."  In the justification game,13
political decisions are "tricks." And rights-claims
are trumps that protect individuals from majority
decisions and are based on the basic goals or values
of the community. In this case, if a Native treaty
right stipulates that he/she has a right to fish, then
an official would have to allow them to do so, even
if they do not think that the community as a whole
would benefit from Natives having this special
right. But the right is not absolute. It is dependent
on the justification for political decisions that it
trumps. The goal of our community, according to
Dworkin, is a form of utilitarianism that justifies
"the fulfillment of as many of people's goals for
their own lives as possible."  If we agree with this,14
how then would rights that go against the interests
of the majority be justified? 
Dworkin finds that the purpose of
utilitarianism is not consistent with majority rule. At
the root of utilitarianism is egalitarianism: "people
are treated as equals when the preferences of each,
weighted only for intensity, are balanced in the
same scales with no distinctions for persons or
merit."  For the sake of consistency, the weights15
that tip the scales in favor of majority or minority
interests must also be consistent with the goals of
utilitarianism. A purely egalitarian goal may favor
majority rule, as it would dictate that the
preferences of a few should not outweigh the
preferences of others. But if these preferences (such
as Nazism, for example) were inconsistent with the
principles of justice that underlie utilitarianism, they
would not be given the same weight. Justice, as a
means of distributing goods and opportunities,
serves utilitarianism by ensuring that everyone
receives their fair share without regards to "who he
is or is not, or that others think he should have less
because of who he is or is not or that others care
less for him than they do for other people."  16
Jennifer Nedelsky disagrees with
Dworkin's game rules. She does not think that rights
as trumps is consistent with the way our society
works in general. First of all, she argues that rights,
like laws passed by the legislature, are collective
choices. Rights represent the values of our society,
which are embedded in the law and given effect by
judges.  Therefore, the way that Dworkin has17
formulated the problem as though there was a
tension between individual rights and democracy18
is not consistent with the role of rights in our
society. 
Instead, she argues that rights are a
"dialogue of democratic accountability."  The19
game is not about tension and balancing, it is about
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inter-dependence and mutual recognition.
According to Dworkin, tension is a necessary part
of the rights discourse because as individuals we
have our own goals and the goal of the community
is to allow us to realize those goals. This, Nedelsky
argues, is not consistent with human nature and
society. For example, the relationship between
mother and child cannot function if it is perceived
to be a matter of weighing the mother's interests
against the interests of the child.  This also carries20
over into the way the Mi'kmaq seemed to perceive
their relationship with the British. Despite the fact
that during negotiations leading up to the treaty they
were concerned with hunting, fishing and trade, in
the treaty ceremony itself they were not concerned
with their interests beyond religion. Likewise, the
dialogue of which Nedelsky speaks would involve
a consideration of the values of our society and the
best means of achieving desirable relationships. 
Democracy as an equal voice in
determining the values that will be embedded in law
may not be easily separated from rights, but
protection from democratic outcomes is a necessary
function of rights.  Our autonomy, freedom of21
conscience and religion may need certain
protections from majority decisions. Often this
protection is perceived to be a matter of weighing
interests against one another, according to some
higher value. But this perception of rights is
dependent on a definition of autonomy as
independence. As this independence involves
separation from others, rights therefore form a
barrier of protection from others and from intrusion
by others.  But if we think of autonomy as22
inter-dependence or independence to form desirable
relationship, the problem at hand is transformed
from tension to dialogue. 
Constructing a tension between democracy
and rights, then, is not helpful because it is not
consistent with the way people relate to one
another. It is more useful, Nedelsky argues, to
consider the source and content of the value against
which we measure the democratic outcome. Once it
is seen that individual rights are collective choices,
and that judges reviewing legislative and executive
acts actually enhances democracy, we can begin to
think of how rights as relationships can move us
beyond the individual vs. collective rights barrier
and also beyond the nationhood vs. conquered
problem with treaty interpretation. Rights can be
re-defined as relationships instead of individualistic
protections if instead of focusing on the limits that
they must enforce, we begin to ask, "what relations
of power, responsibility and duty do we want them
to foster?" Further, following Nedelsky's argument
for rights as democratic accountability instead of
trumps, we would then ask whether the above
relationship would "foster values that are integral to
our culture."
Returning once again to the Glooscap
story, how are all our relations, as integral to our
culture, to be interpreted through rights? And how
do we formulate a way of determining what
relationships are of value in our society? The
process of learning requires that we experience
mistakes. A mistake is a fundamental blip in our
order of things. When we experience it, we have to
stop, reflect and change. This is how my mother
taught me to understand, and it is the foundation of
a good society because it allows for our
understanding and values to always change while
the learning process itself remains the same. So
instead of there being perhaps an end goal of
equality, we would be discussing specific purposes,
and the processes which are going to help us
achieve our goals. At Belcher's farm, the Mi'kmaq
understood that religion is a collective way of
determining these goals, which is why they ensured
that freedom of religion was included as a term in
the treaty. Their conception of rights was collective
in nature. But not in a way that separated them from
others. Freedom does not have to be about
independence. Instead our freedom and right to
self-determination could be about establishing
relationships of respect. As a result, treaty rights
would no longer be about proving whether Native
peoples did or did not lose their nationhood as a
result of being conquered. Instead, the descendants
of the British would respect the guarantee in the
treaties that there would be freedom of religion, in
the way that the Mi'kmaq understood it. 
While discussing the importance of
religion, my grandmother succinctly told me that
religion was good. I asked her why. She gave me
this look. At the time, I thought that I had offended
her but now I think that it was more of an
exasperated look. I was asking too much of her. But
trying to answer it anyway, she said that she had
been baptized, gone through communion and
always attended church. Then she stopped. And told
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me that the church and prayer are two different
things. Her parents had taught her to pray. Of
course, I now begin to realize that all of our
relations are integral to the culture. 
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